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CHAPTER 7 
Uniform Commercial Code 
§7.1. Express warranties under the Uniform Commercial Code: 
Affirmation and sample: General Electric Co. v. United States Dy-
namics, Inc.1 General Electric (GE) brought an action against United 
States Dynamics (Dynamics) for rescission of a contract to purchase a 
gas purifying machine designed to remove oxygen from nitrogen in a 
gas pipeline. Dynamics delivered a model of the contemplated purifier 
for GE's observation and testing, advising GE that the smaller machine 
would operate so that "no hydrogen mixes with the main gas stream."2 
GE retained the model for over one year and reported favorably on its 
perfonnance; whereupon Dynamics built and sold a larger unit, guar-
anteeing that it would purify gas to the level required and that no 
other impurities should be introduced. The larger unit proved incap-
able of excluding hydrogen, thus failing to purify gas to the desired 
level. It was later learned that the model likewise failed to exclude 
hydrogen. 
The action was brought in the Federal District Court for the District 
of Massachusetts. Dynamics counterclaimed for expenses in making 
changes in the gas purifier after notice of nonconformity, and for the 
value of the unreturned model. The court found that the failure of the 
gas purifying machine to exclude hydrogen from gas constituted a 
breach of contract and entitled the buyer to rescission. 
On appeal, the propriety of the trial court's use of summary judg-
ment in finding for GE was raised. The Court of Appeals for the First 
Circuit HELD: On the basis of the pleadings, depositions, exhibits, 
and affidavits, no genuine issues of material fact remained for adju-
dication and the trial court rightly rendered summary judgment for 
GE on both its complaint and Dynamics' counterclaim. 
This casenote reflects the belief that it is incumbent upon the 
practitioner to consider, first, the court's ultimate determination of 
liability in General Electric and, second, the court's analytic orienta-
tion, with a view toward refining the decisional rationale and suggest-
ing alternative approaches to problems raised by the case. Exposition 
of that rationale demands primary focus. 
GE argued that the contract consisted of a Dynamics' letter of price 
quotations; a GE purchase order and specifications requiring that "no 
other impurities should be introduced into the affluent nitrogen";8 a 
§7.1. 14011 F.2d 9115 (1st Cir. 1968). 
2Id. at 954. 
8 Ibid. 
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I?ypanti~~ letter .of agreement to comply with the terms, specifically 
guaranteeing .. ·that ·the equipment ... will purify the quantity of gas 
specified to the level required";' a guaranty of a supply of chemicals; 
and a patent indemnity agreement. It alleged that such contract was 
integrated by Dynamics' letter stating that the purchase order included 
the forementioned documents. All previous negotiations and/or under-
standings were ,thus superseded and rendered extraneous. to the con-
tract. Since the introduction of impurities into the nitrogen gas was 
explicitly pr<;>SCriQed in the contract, given that indisputable introduc-
tion, Dynamics' breach of its warranty of purity was self-evident. 
Dynamics cOntended that the terms of the written contract alone 
should not control in view of Dynamics' reliance on GE'ssuperior 
testing facilities and favorable reports on the perfonriance of the model. 
In the . alternative, Dynamics interpreted the contract simply to dictate 
a "sale by sample,'" the terms of which were satisfied by Dynamics' 
delivery of a larger 'version of the model gas-purifying machine.1i 
Presented with this conflict, the court, in an opinion written by 
Judge Coffin, first acknowledged the limited range of circumstances in 
which the judicial 'device of summary judgment can properly be in-
voked. Citing Ragen v. Ilikon Corp.,e the court stated that the test is 
met "only when the effluent stream of controversy has been purified by 
the exclusion of ano/ genuine issues of material fact."T Next, it docu-
mented GE's account of the integrated contract as a complete and final 
expression of the. mutual undertaking and its neutralizing effect upon 
whatever antecedent. understandings the parties might have enter-
tained, "absent very special circumstances not here present."s While 
it is apparent, at this stage, that the court has found an express war-
ranty in Dynamics' "explicit guarantee that the equipment would 
purify the gaS/'ll, Judge Coffin's first reference to the Code10 was his 
use of Section 2-202, the parol or extrinsic evidence rule. Accordingly, 
evidence of any prior agreement cannot be admitted to contradict the 
terms "set forth in.a writing intended by the parties as a final expres-
sion of their agreement." but such terms "may be explained or supple-
mented (a) by course of dealing or usage of trade ... or by course of 
performance ... ; and (b) by evidence of consistent additional terms 
unless the court finds the writing to have been intended also as a 
complete and exclusive statement of the terms of the agreement."ll 
Application of the exclusionary rule here has the binary effect of refut-
'Ibid. 
!I Ibid. 
!I 561 F.2d 260 (1st Cir. 1966). 
T General Electric: Co. v. United States Dynamics, Inc:., 403 F.2d at 934. 
8 Id. at 954·935. 
II Id. at 934 . 
. 10 The uee was enacted as Chapter 106 of the Massachusetts General Laws. As 
C;orrespondplg ~on numbers are identical, all future referenc:es, unless otherwise 
indicated, are to the 1962 Official Text of the Uniform Commercial Code. 
11 UCC §§2~(a) and (b). 
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ing each alternative contention advanced by Dynamics. Since Dy-
namics' antecedent misunderstanding cannot satisfy the conditions of 
subsection (a), all evidence relating to the model and its testing was 
excluded. 
The court's only other resort to a Code provision came in response 
to Dynamics' abortive use of Section 2-316(3)(b), which provides: 
When a buyer before entering into the contract has examined 
the goods or the sample or model as fully as he desired or has re-
fused to examine the good there is no implied warranty with re-
gard to defects which an examination ought in the circumstances 
to have revealed to him. [Emphasis added.] , 
Section 2-316(8)(b) was hardly the Code provision m,ost pertinent to 
Dynamics' ease12 and was readily dismissed with the observation that 
"inspection could- not off~t express warranties."lS 
It is through this statement, that the court first disc1Qsed its finding 
of the express warranty upon which it based its adjudication of liability. 
Though not cited by the court, perhaps through inadvertence, perhaps 
judicious calculation, the Code provision on express warranties is 
Section 2-313, which reads: 
(1) Express warranties by the seller are created as follows: 
(a) Any affirmation of fact or pr.omise made by the seller to the 
buyer which relates to the goods and becomes part of the 
basis of the bargain creates an express warranty that the 
goods shall conform to the affirmation or promise. 
(b) Any description of the goods which is made part of the 
basis of the bargain creates an express warranty that the 
goods shall conform to the description. 
(c) Any sample or model which is made part of the basis of the 
bargain creates an express warranty that the whole of the 
goods shall conform to the sample or model. 
(2) It is not necessary to the creation of an express warranty that 
the seller use formal words such as "warrant" or "guarantee" 
or that he have a specific intention to make a warranty, but 
an affirmation merely of the value of the goods or a statement 
purporting to be merely the seller's opinion or commenda-
tion of the goods does not create a warranty. 
The language of subsection (l)(a) arguably subsumes Dynamics' agree-
ment to comply with the terms set forth in GE's purchase order. Sub-
section (1)(c), however, acknowledges yet another mode by which 
express warranties are created. It is undisputed that the larger gas 
purifier conformed to the smaller model as expressly warranted under 
Section 2-818(1)(c) since neither was capable of excluding hydrogen 
12 For an explanation of the difference between express and implied warranties 
in general, and the exclusion of the latter by the former, see Rogers Y. Toni Home 
Permanent Co .• 167 Ohio St. 244, 147 N.E.2d 612, 75 A.L.R.2d lOS. 
18 General Electric Co. Y. United States Dynamics, Inc., 40S F.2d at 9S5. 
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from the gas stream. It would thus appear that Dynamics had ex-
pressly, though unwittingly, extended two inconsistent warranties, only 
one of which was breached by the machine's failure to exclude hy-
drogen. The inevitable question of which express warranty should 
prevail, though never posed by the court, merits attention. 
Resort to Section 2-317(a), providing that "exact or technical spec-
ifications displace an inconsistent sample or model or general language 
of description," might have facilitated resolution of this conflict. The 
subsection serves only as a guideline aimed at deciphering the intent 
of the parties when warranties diverge; as such, it is not conclusive.14 
Assuming it were, a sensitive question of fact arises. CouldGE's stated 
requirement that "no other impurities should be introduced ... " and 
Dynamics' respo~ive "guarantee that the equipment ... purify the 
quantity of gas specified to the level required" be properly deemed 
exact or technical specifications? Or might locution of this sort more 
closely approximate general language of description? In either case, the 
question bears more than academic consequence and seems not to be 
one of law.lIS 
Had the trier-of-fact concluded that Dynamics' "model warranty" 
yielded to the express warranty of purity, it should then have adverted 
to either of two Code sections explaining the actions of a buyer upon 
notice of nonconforming chattels: Section 2-602 deals with the manner 
and effect of a buyer's rightful rejection of goOds;16 Section 2-608 
describes the elements of a revocation of acceptance by the purchaser. 
To decide which Section obtains, it is necessary to determine whether 
an acceptance has taken place under Section 2-606. That Section 
reads as follows: 
(I) Acceptance of goods occurs when the buyer 
(a) after a reasonable opportunity to inspect the goods 
signifies to the seller that the goods are conforming or 
that he will take or retain them in spite of their non· 
conformity; or 
(b) fails to make an effective rejection (subsection (I) of 
Section 2-602), but such aoceptance does not occur until 
the buyer has had a reasonable opportunity to inspect 
them; or 
(c) does any act inconsistent with the seller's ownership; 
but if such act is wrongful as against the seller it is an 
acceptance only if ratified by him. 
(2) Acceptance of a part of any commercial unit is acceptance 
of that entire unit. 
14 UCC §2-517, Comment 5. 
111 For an attempt to distinguish between "precise and complete" specifications 
and general descriptive language, see Neville Chemical Co. v. Union Carbide Corp., 
:m F. Supp. 649 (W.D. Pa. 1968). 
16 For an exemplary and recent case on rejection of goods, see Zabriskie Chevrolet, 
Inc. v. Smith. 99 N.J. Super. 441. 240 A.2d 195 (1968). 
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Despite the fact that GE paid for the l gas purifier upon delivery,1T 
a fact alleged in Dynamiai' brief and uncontested, ,by GE, the case , 
for acceptance is less than convincing.' GE . promptly reported the 
inability of the machine to perform in aocordab:ce with its require-
ments, whereupon Dynamics undertook alterations. It rather appears 
that GE effectively rejected the purifier· in keeping ,With Section 
2·602, subsection (I) of which requires that rejection· ·occur. within 
a reasonable time after delivery or tender, and ~t the 1ellc;r be sea· 
sonably notified. Dynamics did not contend that GE's'return of the 
full-Sized unit was tardy since it followed additional testing by GE 
after Dynamics" attempted repairs.GE's interrupted, possession of 
the machinestarcely characterized an "exercise, of O'Wllership by the 
seller."18 While this is not to preclude the possibility, of finding an 
acceptance, and revocation thereof, it seems likely that a court mind-
ful of these Code provisions would conclude that refurn of the gas 
purifier and demand for refund of the purchase price amounted to 
an effective rejection under Section 2·602. In. either· event the Code 
deals explicitly with contractual issues such as those raised by the 
conduct of both parties and thus demands usage. 
That the court might readily serve its end of . "rescinding" . the 
contract for breach of an express warranty thrOugh appropriate use 
of the Code is· demonstrable. Such use would· undeniably render . its 
decision more intelligible and· authoritative. It should ·bestressed, 
however, that the Code itself does not provide for rescission; under 
the Code, the basis of this suit is described by-either Section 2-602 
or Section 2·608. Of far greater import lis the contention herein ad· 
vanced that appropriate use of the Code might indeed serve an en· 
tirely different end, that of barring. rescission a~d finding in favor 
of Dynamics. . . ' ' , , , 
First, the pivotal role of Section '2·202, the parol 'ot extrinsic ev· 
idence rule, a~ employed by the. court in General Itlectric, must be 
appreciated. Intent of the parties to finalize their agreement in writ· 
ing is prerequisite to operation of the parol evidence, rule under 
Section 2·202. Presumably, the court' in, G,eneral Electric. found such 
intent, apparently without di!Btulty. By .. excluding all evidence reo 
lating to GE's testing' and inspection of the model, ~e resultant 
favorable reports of performance, ~nd understandings reached prior 
to the a~tual contract, the. court ab initio invalida~e~ Dynamics' case. 
Each of Dynamics' alterna.tive¢o.ntentions, as well as its cOunterclaim, 
is predicated upon thecoii:h's 'appraisal of ~dente going to circum· 
stances arising prior to completion of the written c.ontract. Exclusion 
of such evidence, and strict limitation of other eVidence to the inte-
grated written contract, clearly simplifies, indeed setdes, the issue. 
Acceptance of the court's use of Sectipn 2·202 makes its award of 
17 Brief of Defendant at Si see Comment S to §2-606 . 
. 18 UCC §2-602(2)(a). 
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summary judgm.entpalatable to even the. most intense advocates of 
trial on the· merits. This acceptance, however, is neither compelled 
by a reading of that Section nor a scanning of apposite authorities. 
Special reference is made to subsection (a) of Section 2-202, permitting 
the. introduction of evidence .to explain or supplement the terms of 
a writ.ten contract "by course of dealing or usage of trade (Section 
1-205) or by course of performance (Section 2-208)." Section 1-205 
(I) defines the first of these exceptional evidentiary areas as "a se-
quence of previous conduct between the parties to a transaction which 
is fairly.to be regarded as establishing a common basis of understand-
i,ng for interpreting their expressions and other conduct." Comment 
2 to Section 1·205 states that course of dealing is restricted, liter-
ally, to ."a sequence of conduct between the parties previous to the 
agreemenL" "Agreement," according to the Code, "means the bargain 
of the parties in fact as found in their language or by implication 
from other circumstances including course of dealing or usage of 
trad~or co.urseof performance as provided in this Act .... "19 Cir· 
cularity aside, the Comment to Section 1-205 assures one that the 
manner in whjch the act treats course of performance signifies that 
"a sequence of conduct after or under the agreement may have equiv-
alent meaning::20 .Thus the definitional exigencies of "agreement" 
would .. seem. to be assuaged and the path cleared for admission of 
evidence relating to the acceptance, testing, and approval of the 
model by GE. Evidence introduced and heard under this exception 
to the parol evidence rule casts the agreement of the parties within 
its proper and complete bargaining context, perhaps explaining the 
actual intent of both the buyer and seller at the time of the contract. 
The significance. of this function is affirmed by the Comment to 
a related proviSion of the Code, Section 2-208. There it is acknowl-
~d that the concept of this Section was borne of such terms as 
"course of dealing," "the circumstances of the case," "the conduct 
oftb.e parties," etc., in the Uniform Sales Act.21 The purpose of 
Section 2-202 -- to consider only those factors indicative of the mean-
ing of the agreement ...;.- is served· by the admission of evidence relating 
to the model gas purifier, however adverse to the interests of a seller 
d~te1'JXlined to exclude such evidence.22 It is also submitted that a 
19 uee §1~20i(lI). 
20 vec §l-205, Comment 2. 
·21 UCC §2·208, Commeat. 
22 Perhaps the court would have done well to adopt the rationale of the Board 
of Contract Appeals; U.s. Atomic Energy Commission, in Carpenter Steel Co., 
(though not a court operating under the Fed. R. Civ. P.): "In accordance with 
Board policy to decide cases on their merits, Whenever appropriate, evidence 
relating to the negotiations leading up to the contract was admitted to aid the 
:Board in interpreting the contract. The admission of such evidence is in accord 
with the provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code which is an appropriate 
source of FederaI.1aw." AECBCA, No. 5·65, 2 U.C.C. Rptg. Serv. 775. 
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finding of mutual intent to integrate the agreement in any given set 
of writings was at least litigable.28 espedally in view of. the model. 
and the cavalier treatment accorded this integral issue was error.II' 
Furthermore. after integrating the contract, the court concluded 
that "the spedfication proscribing the introduction of impurities • • • 
and the explidt guarantee that the equipment would purify the gas. 
cannot. absent very special circumstances not here present, be nul-
lified by antecedent understandings."11i Cited as authority for this 
statement is 8 Corbin on Contracts. Section 578.18 Perhaps more ger-
mane to the issue at hand is Section 590 of the . same volume.lIf Ac-
cording to Professor Corbin. the "mere existence of the·Writing should 
never be held to exclude testimony of . • . an unstated fundamental 
assumption."18 Moreover. evidence of the facts "tending to shO'tlJ that 
such a fundamental assumption was made. though not expressed in 
the writing. should never be excluded by any 'parol evidence rule.' "18 
(Emphasis added.) That fundamental assUl'nption in General Elec-
tric apparently was shared lay both parties prior to discovery of the 
defect; i.e.. no evidence to the contrary. and iIi light of favorable 
reports. it was evidently assumed· that the model could exclude hy-
drogen. Only later was the same defect discovered in the model. Also 
more germane than the court's citation of Section 575 is the obser-
vation of Section 541. 8 Corbin on Contracts. that surrounding cir-
cumstances must always.be known before the meaning of words can 
become plain and clear. 
Whatever the particular door through which evidence of pre-con-
tractual negotiations enters. the parol evidence rule should not be 
a complete bar to admission of certain extrinsic evidence. Evidence 
of prior and/or contemporaneous agreements should be admitted, 
even though inconsistent with the contents ·of the writing. if offered 
for a legitimate purpose. Legitimate purposes include attempts of 
a party to prove that no ~ntract in fact existed. or that the trans-
action was a nullity due80 to fraud. illegality, acx:ident or·mistake. 
In circumstances such as these. strict application of the rule would 
seem to promote. rather than prevent. injustice.81 Since the Code 
28 On intent to integrate the agreement, see 1 Hawkland, A Tranaacdonal Guide 
to the Uniform Commercial Code 167 (1964). 
2<& The Code offers no assistance in resolving the illue of intent to IinaUze an 
agreement in writing. It is presumed that various jurisdictions will rely upon 
pre-Code standards and case law in answering this question of fact. See Hunt 
Foods Be Industries, Inc. v. Doliner, 49 Mise. 2d 246, 267 N.Y.8.2d 564 (1966): Stern Be 
Co. v. State Loim Be Finance Corp., 258 F. Supp. 901 (D. Del. 1965). . 
211 General Electric Co. v; United Statei Dynamics, Inc., 405 F.2d at 95{'955. 
28 Id. at 955. .
Sf 5 Corbin on Contracts §59O (1960). 
28 Ibid. 
29 Ibid. 
BOld. §S80. 
B1Dallas Farm Mach. Co. v. Reave., 158 Tex. I, !J07 S.W.2d 255 (1957): Bate. v. 
Southgate, 508 Mass. 170, 51 N.E.2d 551 (1941). 
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declines to overrule principles of the law and equity, unless specif-
ically displaced by particular provisions of the act, S2 this operational 
view of the parol evidence rule survives Section 2-202. 
Perhaps an aspect of the General Electric opinion beckoning even 
closer scrutiny than exclusionary use of Section 2-202 is the failure of 
the court to define the express warranty or warranties purportedly 
breached by Dynamics in terms of the Code, specifically Section 2-313, 
subsections (I)(a) and (c).ss As observed earlier, Dynamics conceivably 
advanced two inconsistent warranties, only one of which was recog-
nized by the court. It was suggested that, had the court identified 
both an "affirmation warranty" and a "model warranty,"S4 it might 
have attached pre-em.inent significance to the former through use 
of Section 2-317(a). Suggestions such as this, however, presuppose 
the very existence of each express warranty, while the language of 
subsections (I)(a) and (c) of Section 2-313, specifically the recurring 
phrase "part of the basis of the bargain," invites deeper study. 
For a seller to expressly warrant his goods under Section 2-313(1)(a), 
his affirmation of fact or promise to the buyer must, first, relate to 
those goods and, second, become part of the basis of the bargain. 
Similarly, to create an express warranty under Section 2-313(1) 
(c) - to warrant that goods shall conform to a sample or model-
seller's model or sample must be made part of the basis of the bar-
gain. Two questions arise: (I) Are we to assume that both Dynamics' 
affirmation of guaranteed purity and the model became, or were made, 
part of the basis of the bargain? (2) How does one determine what 
is and what is not part of the basis of the bargain? 
David Meilinkoff, discussing definitional imprecision in the Code,311 
regretfully observes that the term "bargain" is "nowhere defined" 
by the drafters of the Code.86 The inquiry, therefore, is not one of 
strict definition but rather focuses upon purposes underlying revi-
sion of the statutory predecessors of Section 2-313(1)(a) and (c), Sec-
tions 12 and 16 of the Uniform Sales Act.8'/' Section 12 defined express 
warranty as: "Any affirmation of fact or any promise by the seller 
relating to the goods . . . if the natural tendency of such affirmation 
or promise is to induce the buyer to purchase the goods, and if the 
buyer purchases the goods relying thereon."S8 (Emphasis added.) 
8'2 UCC §1-IOll. 
as UCC §2-1I111(1)(a) and (c) quoted infra. 
84 Exclusionary use of the parol evidence rule would arguably negate such "model 
warranty" if no mention of model were included in contract. However, counsel for 
Dynamics claims in his brief (p. 6) that reference to the model is contained in the 
correspondence which, together with GE's purchase order and specifications, com-
prised the contract. 
811 Mellinkoff, The Language of the Uniform Commercial Code, 77 Yale L.J. 185 
(1967). 
86 Id. at 189. 
aT G.L., c. 106, §§14 and 18, repealed by enactment of the UCC. 
88 G.L, c. 106, §14. 
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Actual reliance, notes John M. Stockton in Law of Sales;~9is the lan-
guage of both the common law and the Uniform Sales Act, not that 
of the Code, which rather insists upon a "basis of the bargain" test. 
The comparative results of such test, when· applied to actual calleS, 
are not likely to differ, according to Stockton. One! might conclude, 
inferentially, that, had the drafters of the Code intended to substan-
tially alter or eliminate the common law "reliance" test articulated 
by· the Sales Act, the language of Section 2-8 lS, or the Comment 
thereto, would make that intention. clear . .o The Comment does out-
line a significant change in the status of waITanties of description 
and sample, once again "express" rather than "implied." It also states: 
"In general, the presumption is that any sample or model . . . is in-
tended to become a basis of the bargain. But there is no 'escape from 
the question of fact .... 1 The second statement bears directly on the 
use of summary judgment in these matters. On the basis of what the 
Comment does say, and of what· the Code itself neither says nor im-
plies, it is difficult to escape the conclusion that, at the very least, 
"reliance" and "part of the basis of the bargain" are operational, 
if not conceptual, equivalents.a 
Comment 8 to .section 2-S15 reiterates this fundamental query: 
"What statements of the seller have in the circumstances and in ob-
jective judgment become part of the basis of the bargain? ... [A]l1 
of the statements of the seller do so unless good reason is shown to 
the contrary." (Emphasis, added.) Enlightened .use of Section 2-202 
in General Electric would permit the seller to show. good reason to 
the contrary, to establish that the object of the buyer'S admitted reo 
liance was not an aflirmation of fact relating to the large gas puri-
fier but the apparently ~ccessful .performance· of the model during 
a period of over one year. The contention that GE actually relied 
upon a model which. was made part of the basis of the bargain, as 
through Section 2-S18(1)(c), hardly seems .unreasonable; .. certainly 
Dynamics' intent to induce purchase with delivery iof a model is in-
dicated by the facts. Subsequent COlDmitment to writing of the con· 
tractual terms seems to assume the visage. of· customarily formal 
business procedure, and it cannot be construed ipso facto to accu-
rately reflect the intent. of the parties. '8 
Of far greater use in determining the basis of a seller's reliance, 
89 &tockton, Law of Sales 67 (1968) . 
• 0 UCC §1-l08 • 
• 1 UCC §2-lJllJ, Comment 6. 
'2In Warranties Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 22 Arb. J. 175 (1967), 
Oliver M. Blackburn discusses the interpretative difficUltiea raised by the Code's use 
of the term warranty and relates . reliance to the "basis of the bargain" concept by 
noting those jurisdictions favorably disposed towards sellers' arguments that buyers 
must establish reliance 00 tlie ll1leged warranty to obtain relief . 
• 8 See Speed Fasteners, Inc. v. Newsom. 882 F.2d 895 (10th Cir. 1967). in which it 
was held reversible error to permit a jury to consider an alleged breach of express 
warranty under UCC §2.fJIJ(1) where there wu DO showing that the buyer relied 
on any promise. advertisement or description of the product purchased. 
9
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whether' upon affirmation sample or description, is the time.honored 
inquiry into the relative skill and expertise of the respective con. 
tracting parties. The buyer's knowledge, or opportunity for knowl-
ledge, relates unequivocally to the reasonableness of contending that 
GE relied upon representations made by Dynamics or "purchased 
on his own judgment."" In General Electric, the superior testing 
facilities of the buyer are uncontroverted; Dynamics in fact had none. 
In light of this technological imbalance, the court's tacit premise 
of an express warranty by affirmation or promise appears somewhat 
spurious; and DynamicS' "sale by sample" contention gains credence.'11 
Left only with a Section 2·S18(I)(c) warranty, no inconsistencies need 
be resolved, with or without the guidance of Section 2·S1 7(a). The 
performance of the large gas purifier plainly satisfied Dynamics' ex· 
press warranty by sample or model;" hence, no breach of warranty 
and no basis for rescission of the contract. 
In concluding its opinion, the court in General Electric first in· 
terprets appellants' request, then renders it absurd through analogy, 
thus: . 
Dynamics, to take a view of the evidence most favorable to 
it, would have us read out of a contract a subsequent express 
commitment in writing because of a prior inchoate impression 
from GE that the commitment was a safe one to make. No more 
~ we do this than to say that a seller of a horse who relies on 
the innocent bad judgment of a buyer that the horse is sound 
and expressly. warrants its soundness can escape the burden of 
his bargain." 
The inaccuracy of the court's interpretation of Dynamics' case has 
been demonstrated; Dynamics points not to a "prior inchoate impres-
sion from GE" but to the prior existence of an express warranty by 
sample, a warranty reflecting the "true" intent of the parties as it 
goes direcdy to the basis of the bargain. 
Whatever the ultimate decision on key questions of reliance, ex-
trinsic evidence, intent to integrate, and express warranties, it must 
be conceded that these are questions of fact, not law. Award of sum~ 
~ See Wallace v. McCampbell, 17& Tenn. 224, 156 S.W.2d 442 (1941), in which 
the court notes that the purchaser was in a position to enlighten seller. 
411 See Annot., Sale by Sample- Warranty, 12 A.L.R:.2d 524 (1950), for a dis-
cussion of what constitutes a sale by sample as regards warranties. Cited therein is 
a long line of cases upholding the significanCe of parties' intent and determination 
of IIIch intent by jury. Abo cited: Androvette v. Parks, 2fY1 Mill. 86, 92 N.E. 1006 
(1910), which stands for the proposition that written contracts must contain refer· 
ence to sainple for sale by sample to obtilin. See note 54 supra. 
48 In the unlikely circumstance that the trier·of·fact findlli the evidence in· 
suflicient to support either an express warranty by aflirmation or sample, due to 
the reliance requirement, UCC §2·S15 depicts the elements of an "implied warranty 
of fitness for a particular purpose." There, however, the reliance requirement is 
explicit. 
~'General Electric Co. v. United States Dynamia, Inc., 401 P.2d at 955. 
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mary judgment on the pleadings, depositions, and affidavits is ap-
propriate only when there is no substantial factual controversy 
requiring trial;" only when .the truth is clear and where no genuine 
issue remains for trial;.' and, most significantly, should not be granted 
when the intent of the parties is an issue.1SO In Skopes Rubber Corp. 
v. U.S. Rubber CO.,lIl the First Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that 
the question of whether the failure of machine-applied vinyl-coated 
material for skin-diving suits to conform to sample hand-applied 
vinyl-coated material breached the contract was for jury determina-
tion. In Sylvia Coal Co. v. Mercury Coal and Coke Co.," the issues 
of whether goods were sold by sample under Section 2-S13(I)(c) and 
whether there was a breach of an express or implied warranty for 
failure to conform to the sample were questions of fact to be decided 
by a jury. The list of cases and authorities to this effect is 10ng.A In-
deed, in General Electric, the court li~ted summary judgment to 
circumstances in which the "efHuent stream of controversy has been 
purified by exclusion of any genuine issues of material fact."" The 
preceding inquiries demonstrate, if nothing else, that the standards 
of that test have barely been approached by the facts of General Elec-
triC.1I1I ' 
Yet another aspect of the case evoking only summary treatment 
is the countercla.im advanced by Dynamics. First, Dynamics sought 
compensation for expenses incurred while attempting to rectify the 
inability of the machine to exclude hydrogen; second, Dynamics 
claimed the value of the model not returned by GE, alleging that 
GE "replaced certain portions and removed certain chemicals."II. 
The court's denial of the second claim is of particular interest since, 
unlike rejection of the first, it is not an automatic sequel to the fore-
going rationale. As "[t]here is no indication .that either action was 
"R.agen v; Ilikon Corp., 561 F.2d 260 (lit Coir. 1966) • 
• 9 United States v. Burket, 402 F.2d '26 (lat ca. 1968). 
DO American Meaer Corp. v. Travelers Indemnlty Co., 45 F.R..n. 265 (S.D.N.Y. 
1968). 
111299 F.2d 584 (1st Coir. 1962). 
u 151 W. Va. 818, 156 S.E.2d 1 (1967). 
A In Martin v. J. C. Penney Co., 50 Wash. 2d 560, !lUI P.2d 689, 80 A.L.ll.2d fI¥1 
(1957), conClededly a cue involving alleged breach of an impUed warranty of fitness, 
the questions of buyer's reliance and actual breach by seller were properly left for 
jury determination. 
"General Electric Co. v. United States Dynamics, Inc., 4O!I F.2d at 954. 
IlIlSome federal COurtl go further. In Palmer v. ChamberUn, 191 F.2d 5!12, 540 
(5th Clr. 1951),· it was held that ''before rendering summary judgment the Court 
must be satisfied not ollly that there is no issue as to any material fact, but also 
that the moving party is entided to a judgment as a matter of law. Where, as in 
this case, the decision of a question of law by the Court depends upon an inquiry 
into the surrounding facti and drcumstances,. the Court should refuse to grant a 
motion for summary judgment until the facts andcircumstanca have been sum-
ciendy developed to enable the Court to be reasonably certain that it il making a 
correct determination of the question of law." 
118 General Electric CO. ,v. United States Dynamics. Inc., 4O!I F.2d at 955. 
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not permitted or contemplated· by Dynamics, was damaging to the 
apparatus, or could possibly be categorized as an exercise of domin-
ion,"GT Dynamics' request fails. 
Rather than disentangle phrases of indefinite theoretical origin 
and consequence, Slich as "damaging to the apparatus" and "exercise 
of dominion," it is appropriate to look to Dynamics' brief for what 
seems to be the underlying motive of its counterclaim. Though no 
mention of this appears in the decision, it is a matter of grave concern 
to Dynamics that "[b]oth the model unit and the machine manu-
factured for General Electric contained chemicals employed in the 
process of removing oxygen gas in an unpatentable but nevertheless 
secret process . . . ."118 While informed that the "process was secret 
and the exclusive property of the defendant ... ,"119 GE removed 
and analyzed these chemicals and studied this process, "so that it now 
possesses all information necessary to manufacture maqtines iden-
tical to those of the plaintiff . . . ."eo Dynamics further notes that, 
"almost immediately after declaring the defendant's process unsat-
isfactory, the plaintiff, after endeavoring for a period of thirty years 
to develop a new method of removing oxygen from nitrogen, com-
pleted the construction of a new unit, which it is now using ... ."81 
These allegations are of more than passing interest since they would 
seem to embody the gravamen of Dynamics' counterclaim. Claiming 
the fair value of a model originally worth $1995,82 Dynamics appar-
ently proceeds upon either a "quantum meruit" theory of recovery 
or one which presupposes the existence of a separate contract cover-
ing the model gas purifier. In the unlikely event that such a contrac-
tual obligation is found, Dynamics might well invoke Section 2-606 
(1) (a) to the effect that GE accepted the smaller unit. One year is 
probably ample time for inspection;88 it is probably reasonable to 
regard favorable reports of performance as notification to the seller 
that the goods are conforming. Acceptance of the model requires 
either that GE pay for the machine or revoke its acceptance thereof, 
pursuant to Section 2-608.84 
Given the tenuousness of the basic premise, however, it seems un-
reasonable to apply Code provisions on acceptance of goods to the 
liT Ibid. 
118 Brief of Defendant at 11. 
lit Ibid. 
eo Id. at 11-4. 
81 Id. at 6-7. 
ald. at 4. 
88 In GE'. brief at page 2, it is alleged that the model was retained by GE for a 
period of one year and ten month •• 
84 UCC §2-608(l1) provides: "A buyer who 10 revokes has the same rights and 
duties with regard. to the goods involved as if he had rejected them." Those duties 
include holding the goods with reasonable care for the seller's disposition. See 
uee §2·602(2)(b) and Comment. If GE either rejected or revoked acceptance of the 
model, the query becomes whether those duties imposed upon the buyer by the 
Cade were fulfilled. 
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small gas purifier "qua goods." It is suggested ,here dult the question 
of whether Dynamics gratuitously :deli~d a· functional piece of 
sophisticated machinery to GE in hopes of inducing the sale of a 
larger version is. again. a question of~t, involving the intent and 
understanding of the parties. It is alsolproposed that Dynamics' coun-
terclaim wo.uld bear greater weight if it were based expUddy upon 
GE's use. or future use. of Dynamics' "secret process." Such a claim 
might sustain injunctive. rather than contractual. relief in an ap-
propriate court. 
In summary. analysis of the General Electric decision reveals. its 
lamentable simplicity and inexplicable indifference. to applicable 
Code provisions. It is tellingly significant that the q)urt. in its terse 
dismissal of DynaJDics' "sale by sample" contention. not so subdy 
suggests that the small·gas purifying machine is a "model/' not a 
"sample." Had the court been operating within the conceptual frame-
work of the Code, such a distinction would not have been macle. 
Several conclusions are ine~pable. First, substantive contractual 
and warranty issues raised by this case fall well within the purview 
of the Uniform Commercial Code. Interpretative use of pertinent 
Code provisions. while enhancing the cogency and authority of the 
opinion. might serve the same ultimate end of avoiding ,the contract, 
if the disposition of the courtia resolute. Conversely, Code provisions, 
properly construed., might materially. alter the outcome of the case. 
Second. the court's limited reading of the parol evidence rule is sus-
pect. Its strict construction ,is reminiscent of pre-Codease law and 
fails to recognize the Code's liberalized translation of that hoary 
and controversial legal axiom. Third, if exclusionary use of the parol 
evidence rule is deemed unduly harsh and inappropriate under Sec-
tion 2-202, then sustenance of summary judgment for GE by the 
court is indefensible. "Genuine issues of material fact" were not ac-
corded recognition, much less adjudication. Fourth; and finally. the 
court's limited use of the Code is. on one hand. unaccountable and, 
on the other. misleading. In light of factors such as Massachusetts' 
early enacunent of the, Code. the level of the court., and the teS9Urces 
of the parties. legal and otherwise, the conspicuous absence of Code-
oriented debate defies explanation. The resultant decision is a po-
tential source of future and unnecessary confusion in an area well 
covered by the Uniform Commercial Code. 
RICHARD INNIs 
§7.2. Assignment of. commercial lease: Provision relieving as-
signee of leuors obligations: Noblett v. ,General Electric Credit 
Corp.1- General Electric, Credit Corporation (GECC) took assign-
ment of a lease by which Noblett had. rented eight bowling pin set-
§7.2. 1400 F.2d 442 (lOth eir. 1968), pedtioo for rehearing denied, 400 F.2d 448, 
c:ert. denied, !!9!! U.S. 935 (1968), rev's 268 F. Supp. 984 rH.D. Okla. 196'1). . 
13
Mooney: Chapter 7: Uniform Commercial  Code
Published by Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School, 1969
§7.2 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 141 
ting machines from Bowl-Mor Company, GECC's assignor. The lease 
included the following clause: 
The Lessor may assign all its right, title and interest under this 
lease including the payments due hereunder, but the assignee 
shall not be held responsible for any of the lessor's obligations. 
The obligations of the lessee shall, however, continue in full 
force and effect. 
Noblett subsequently defaulted on the lease and assignee GECC 
sued to recover the accelerated balance due. In his answer, Noblett 
raised among other defenses that of failure of consideration by reason 
of alleged. breaches of express warranty against defects and implied 
warranty of fitness, and non-fulfillment of the lessor's obligations 
to furnish training and advertising assistance. GECC moved for sum-
mary judgment contending that in accordance with the terms of the 
assignment clause, Noblett had agreed not to assert any defenses 
agaimt an assignee, as authorized by Section 9"206 of the Uniform 
Commercial Code. The Federal District Court for the Western Dis-
trict of Oklahoma, applying Massachusetts law2 in accordance with 
a provision of the lease, agreed that Noblett had thereby waived the 
pleaded defenses as against the assignee and entered summary judg-
ment far GECC.s 
The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reversed 
and HELD: The clause in question did not operate as a waiver of 
defenses under Section 9-206(1) of the Code since its sole purpose 
was to relieve an assignee of any affirmative duty to fulfill the lessor's 
obligations.· In support of its interpretation the court referred to 
Section 2-210(4) of the Code which, absent language or circumstances 
to the contrary, imposes upon the assignee of a contract the affirma-
tive duties of the assignor. GECC petitioned for a rehearing en banc 
contending that a provision of Article 2 of the Code had been mis-
interpreted by the appellate court as governing an Article 9 secured 
transaction and that the clause in question should have been inter-
preted as a w¥ver of defenses against an assignee in accordance with 
Section 9-206(1) of the Code .. Following the court's denial of its peti-
tion,1I GECC petitioned the United States Supreme Court for a writ of 
certiorari. Certiorari was denied.6 
The opinion of the court of appeals raises several interesting ques-
tions regarding both the relationship between Article 9 and Article 2 of 
the Uniform Commercial Code and the application of Article 2 sales 
2 All references to the Code refer to the 1962 Official Text, unless otherwise 
indicated. The UCC was enacted as Chapter 106 of the Massachusetts General 
Laws. Section numbers in the two documents are identical. 
a 268 F. Supp. 984 (W.D. Okla. 1967). 
4.Noblett v. General Electric Credit Corp., 400 F.2d at 446. 
IIId. at 448. 
e 393 u.s. 935 (1968). 
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principles to a transaction involving a lease. Consideration of these 
questions necessarily begins with an examination of the Code provisions 
applicable to the case. Section 9-206(1) of the Uniform Commercial 
Code. under which GECC sought to establish the waiver of defenses. 
provides in part: 
(1) Subject to any statute or decision which establishes a different 
rule for buyers or lessees of consumer goods. an agreement by a 
buyer or lessee that he will not assert against an assignee any claim 
or defense which he may have against the seller or lessor is enforce-
able by the assignee who takes his assignment for value, in good 
faith and without notice of a claim or defense. except as to 
defenses of a type which may be asserted against a holder in due 
course of a negotiable instrument under the Article on Commer-
cial Paper (Article 5) .. 
The district court. in holding that the assignment clause excused. 
GECC from any responsibility for the omissions complained of by 
Noblett. seemed firmly convinced that the portion of the assignment 
clause which stipulated that "assignee shall not be held responsible for 
any of the lessor's Bowl-Mor's obligations" precluded Noblett from 
raising nonfulfillment of any of Bowl-Mor's "obligations" as a defense 
against GECC. '1 In so interpreting the clause the court ac.corded it. the 
effect of an express waiver of defenses against an assignee as allowed by 
Section 9-206(1) of the Code. 
The court of appeals. however. injected an entirely new element 
into the case. In construing the .clause as intended to relieve the as-
signee of the duty of fulfilling any of Bowl-Mor's obligations to Noblett. 
the court referred to Section 2-210(4) of the Code. which provides that: 
An assignment of "the contract" or of "all my rights under the 
contract" or an assignment.in similar general terms is an assign-
ment of rights and unlesS the language or the circumstances (as 
in an assignment for security) indicate the contrary. it is a delega-
tion of performance· of the duties of the assignor and its aoceptance 
by the assignee constitutes a promise by him to. perform those 
duties. This promise is enforceable by either the assignor or the 
other party to the original contract. 
The court interpreted this provision of the Code to mean that: 
or "Whether the allegations in the answer and amendment thereto, to-wit: breach 
of warranty of fitneu of the machines; disregard of the agreement to provide 'on-
the-jo~ trainin~; and failu~e to make allowance for advertising and sign, be 
technically deugnated as 'defense,' 'counterclaim' or 'set-off' and regardless of 
whether defendant seeks recision. of the contract or aflirmance with damages to 
him because of the alleged breach, it is clear that all of the omiBSions complained 
of by him were obligations of Bowl-Mor, not plaintiff. It seems further to be clear 
from the contract that p1aiDtiff g.i exonerated 'from reaponsibility for all of these 
complaints unless the contract provision allowing same be invalid." 268 F. Supp. 
at 986. 
15
Mooney: Chapter 7: Uniform Commercial  Code
Published by Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School, 1969
§7.2 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 143 
An assignment in general terms under the Uniform Commercial 
Code, and, hence, under present Massachusetts law, is an assign-
ment of rights, and unless the language or the circumstances 
indicate the contrary, it is also a delegation of performance of the 
duties of the assignor and its acceptance by the assignee, constitut-
ing a promise by him to perform those duties.8 
With regard to the lease provision in question, the court observed: 
The provisions [sic] of the lease agreement which speaks in terms 
of obligations is peculiarly suited to an indication for the purposes 
of Se_ction 2-210(4) that there was no "delegation of the perfor-
mance of the duties of the assignor" or a "promise by him to per-
form those duties." Indeed, more apt language for this purpose 
could hardly be devised than was used in the lease agreement.9 
In its; petition for rehearing, GECC contended that the court had 
interpre·ted Section 2-210(4) of the Code as applying to this lease trans-
action and that inasmuch as Article 2 of the Code governs only sales 
transactions, such an interpretation was erroneous. The primary basis 
for the ,court's decision, however, does not appear to be grounded in 
its suggestion that the purport of the clause in question was to avoid 
affirmative obligations theoretically imposed upon the assignee by 
Section :~-210(4). The case appears to tum on the court's reluctance to 
read the wording of the lease clause as a definite "waiver of defen.ses." 
Since this was so, the court declared "the rule continued operative that 
failure of consideration could be raised as a defense either against the 
assignee or the assignor .... "10 This reluctance was apparently occas-
ioned by the fact that prior Massachusetts law, as enunciated in the 
case of Quality Finance Co. v. Hurley,11 established a "policy" in Mas-
sachusettsadverse to the enforcement of contract clauses purporting to 
be blanket waivers of defenses against assignees. Hence, the appellate 
court in Noblett felt that since Section 9·206 of the Code alters this 
established policy by explicitly permitting agreements not to assert any 
"claim or defense" against an assignee, any clause intending to do so 
should manifest a clear intention to waive defenses. 
In responding to the petition for rehearing, the court could have 
emphasized this interpretation of the clause itself as the basis for its 
decision, thereby minimizing the effect of GECC's allegation that the 
reference to Section 2-210(4) blatantly contravened fundamental Code 
definitions and principles. Instead, the court again chose to refer to 
Section 2-210(4). The context of this reference is revealing: 
... In other words, it is argued that "the application of Section 
2-210(4) was erroneous" and would open all secured transactions to 
8 Noblett v. General Electric Credit Corp., 400 F.2d at 446·447. 
9Id. at 446. 
10 Id. at 447. 
11 !I!I7 Mass. 150, 148 N.E.2d !l85 (1958). 
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question by indicating that in the absence of specific negation the 
obligation of petformance would be placed upon the security 
holder as a matter of course. It should have been enough to pre-
clude such misunderstanding to quote, as we did, Section 2-210(4) 
which states among othet things that there is a delegation of pet-
formance "unless the language or the circumstances (as in an 
assignment for security) indicated the contrary." [Emphasis added.] 
We did not refer to Section 2-210(4) to indicate that the "Sales" 
provisions of the Code necessarily governed Secured "f.ransactions 
in the absence of language so providing but rather to demonstrate 
that waiver of affirmative performance is not the same as waiver 
of defenses for non-performance by a party to the original con-
tract.12 
A close reading of this excerpt discloses some intriguing ambiguities. 
In response to GECC's objection that the court had erred in applying 
Section 2-210(4) of the "Sales" Article of the Code to a "SecUred Trans-
action" involving a lease, the court maintained that the quotation 
from Section 9-210(4) "should have been enough to preclude such 
misunderstanding •. . :' By this statement, the court could have 
meant anyone of the following: (1) Section 2-210(4) does apply to the 
lease situation under consideration but does not impose obligations of 
performance upon this assignee because the court views the lease as 
having been assigned for secUrity, thus clarifying any "misunderstand-
ing" concerningtbe affinnative obligations of an assignee; or (2) 
Section 2-210(4) does ;not, apply and was only referred to analogously 
since the court believed that a security interest governed by Article 9 
was involved, thus clarifying any "misunderstanding" sutrounding the 
court's purpose in ,referring to Section 2-210(4); or (8) Section 2-210(4) 
does apply to the lease before the court, but does not impose obliga-
tions of performance upon the assignee because the "waiver clause" in 
the lease served as adequate "language indicat[ing] the contrary ...... 18 
that is, the assignor's affirmative obligations would not run with the 
assignment. This, again,' clears ,up any "misunderstanding" concerning 
the affirmative obligations of an assignee.' 
It is interesting to note that the court emphasized the phrase "as in 
an assignment for seCurity" which tends to support possibility (1). On 
the other hand. the next sentence of the opinion seems to declare that 
Sec;:tion 2-210(4) was only invoked to demonstrate the difference between 
a waiver of aftimlative performance and a waiver of defenses, thus 
supporting either possibiliGy (2) or (~. The subtly ambiguous wording 
which gives rise to these possible interpretations of language in the 
opinion suggests that ,the court may have been choosing its words very 
careftilIy. Indeed, the court seems to have deliberately avoided issuing 
a dear statement regarding theapplicabiIity or nonapplicability of the 
12 Noblett v. General Electric Credit Corp., 400 F.2d at 448. 
18 See UCC §2-210(4). 
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sales provisions of the Code to the commercial lease under considera-
tion. This ambiguity, .if intentional, may have been influenced by the 
tendency on the part of a number of courts to treat the burgeoning 
practice of leasing goods, equipment, and vehicles as essentially anal-
ogous to sales and to apply sales principles in cases involving such 
leases.14 These courts have doubtless been influenced by a number of 
anthorities who have long been urging this resultlli and, perhaps, by 
certain language of the Code itself which points in that direction.16 
Initially, the decisions taking this approach were founded upon a 
bailment principle of implied warranty of fitness for intended purposes 
which can be traced to the common law. One of the first American 
decisions adopting this principle was Hoisting Engine Sales Co. v. 
Hart,lT a case involving a lease of construction equipment. The court, 
after tracing the principle of implied warranty of fitness in bailments 
through numerous English and American precedents, adopted what it 
stated was the English view as codified at that time in I Halsbury's 
Laws of England §11l7:18 
... The owner of a chattel which he lets out for hire is under 
an obligation to ascertain that the chattel so let out by him is rea-
sonably ti,t and suitable for the purpose for which it is expressly 
H See Sawyer v. Pioneer Leasing Corp., 244 Ark. 943, 951, 428 S.W.2d 46, 51 
(1968) (concerning the proliferation _of leasing establi~ents and treating the long-
term lease of an ice machine as "analogous to a sale" in applying breach of implied 
warranty provisions of the Code); Cintrone v. Hertz Truck Leasing and Rental 
Serv.,45 N.J. 434, 450, 212 A.2d 769, 777 (1965) (taking judicial notice of the growth 
of the business of leasing vehicles and applying common law sales principles of 
breach of warranty to a truck rental); Farnsworth, Implied Warranties of Quality 
in Non-Sales Cases, 57 Colum. L. Rev. 653 (1957) (noting the boom in enterprises 
which thrive on the rental of everything from automobiles and floor waxers to 
linens and diapers, and urging the extension of implied warranties of fitness to 
-leasing situations). 
111 See, e.g., Dueaenberg and King, S Sales Be Bulk Transfers Under the U.C.C. 
§7.oi[2][bJ (1966) (urging extension of implied warranty of merchantability to bail-
ments and leases); Willier and Hart, Forms and Procedures Under the U.C.C. 
1112.02[1] (1969) (urging the analogous application of express and implied warranty 
provisions of ·the Code to leases.of goods); Farnsworth, note 14 supra, at 673-674; 
See also, Note, The Uniform Commercial Code As a Premise for Judicial Reason-
ing, 65 Colum. L. Rev. 880, 891-892 (1965) (predicting application of UCC §2-302 
beyond sales since the problem of unconscionability is not confined to sales); Note, 
Unconscionable Sales Contracts and the Uniform Commercial Code, Section 2-802, 
45 Va. L. Rev. 58!1, 590-591 (1959) (commenting on potential for application of 
§2-!I02 beyond sales). 
16 See uec §2-102 (generally defining the scope of Article 2 as applying to "trans-
actions in goods"); Comment 2 to UCC §2-!l1!I (indicating that warranties could be 
applied to non-sales transactions "such as in the case of bailments for hire''); See 
also, Hawkland, A Transactional Guide to the Uniform Commercial Code 90 (1964) 
(reference to Comment 2 to §2-!l1!1 as suggesting application beyond strictly sales); 
The Uniform Commercial Code As a Premise for Judicial Reasoning, note 15 
supra, at 887. 
172!J7 N.Y. !lO, 142 N.E. lI42 (1928). 
18 See the modern equivalent of this provision in 2 Halsbury's Laws of England 
§2!J7 (M ed. 195!1) (citing English cases from as early as 1845). 
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let out, or for which, from its character, he must be aware it is 
intended to be used; his deUvery of it to the hirer amounts to an 
implied warranty that the chattel is in fact as fit and suitable for 
that purpose-as reasonable care and skill can make it.19 
A later case, Motion Pictures for T.V. v. North Dakota Broadcasting 
CO.,20 involving the leasing of films for television, reviewed a number 
of the earlier cases and formulated the following principle: "By analogy 
the law applicable to sales contracts should logically apply to a contract 
of bailment and license such as the one under consideration in this 
case."21 
The trend initiated in these earlier cases has continued to the present 
day. A significant modem case applying the common law principle of 
implied warranty in fitness to a rental contract is Cintrone v. Hertz 
Truck Leasing and Rental Service.22 In essence, the Cintrone case held 
that public policy considerations require ~at the lessee as well as the 
buyer of automobiles be protected against injuries from defective 
component parts. The lengthy opinion examines numerous authorities 
and previous cases whiCh had urged the propriety and desirability of 
affording warranty protections to lessees of goods. Since the Cintrone 
decision is based mainly upon the COmmon law concept' of implied 
warranty of fitness,28 it is not basically a Code decision. However, in 
support of extending warranty coverage to leases, the opinion cites 
Comment 2 to Section 2-SIS of the Uniform Commercial Code which 
states: 
[W]arranties need not be confined either to sales contracts or to 
the direct parties to such a contract. They may arise· in other 
appropriate circumstances such as in the case of bailments for 
hire .... 
In another case decided in the same year as Cintrone, the United 
States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia invoked the com-
mon law principle of unconscionability to set aside the telllls of a con-
tract purporting to be a lease of household items. Williams v. Walker-
Thomas Furniture CO.24 involved a furniture company which utilized 
a lease form rather than a conditional sales contract. in its sales to 
consumers. This "lease" purported to rent to the customer each item 
he had purchased for a stipulated monthly rental and further provided 
that when the total of these monthly "rental payments" equalled the 
cost of the items "leased," title would pass to the customer. The con-
1112S7 N.Y. at S7. 142 N.E. at S44. 
20 87 N.W.2d 7S1 (N.D. 1958). 
21 Id. at 7S4. See Annot.: Warranti~ in connection. with leasing or hiring of 
chattels. 68 A.L.R..2d 850. 854; 9 Williston on Contracts §1041 (Sd ed .• Jaeger. 
1967). 
22 45 N.J. 4S4. 212 A.2d 769 (1965). 
28 See text at note 18 Ilupra. 
24 S50 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir. 1965). 
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tract contained another intricately worded provision, the primary 
effect of which, in the words of the Court, was: 
. . . to keep a balance due on every item purchased until the 
balance due on all items, whenever purchased, was liquidated. As a 
result, the debt incurred at the time of purchase of each item was 
secured by the right to repossess all the items previously purchased 
by the same purchaser, and each new item purchased automatically 
became subject to a security interest arising out of the previous 
dealings.211 
The plaintiffs in Williams had defaulted on their payments under such 
contracts and the defendant furniture company sought to repossess 
every item purchased by the plaintiffs during the five years previous 
to the default. In striking down the "leases" as unconscionable, the 
court invoked the common law concept of unconscionability. The 
Uniform Commercial Code, which had recently been enacted by Con-
gress, was not in force in the Dictrict of Columbia when the leases in 
question were executed. The court, however, referred to the uncon-
scionability provision of the Code to support its decision, commenting: 
[W]e <:<>nsider the Congressional adoption of Section 2-302 
persuasive authority for following the rationale of the cases from 
which the section is explicitly derived. Accordingly, we hold that 
where the element of unconscionability is present at the time a 
contract is made, the contract should not be enforced.26 
Other cases have progressed beyond applying common law principles 
to lease contracts and have specifically applied various sale provisions 
of the Code to such transactions. Such a case was Electronics Corpora-
tion of America v. Lear Jet Corp.,27 involving the lease of an aircraft. 
The lease contained the following provision: 
Lessor itself makes no express or implied warranties or represen-
tations as to any matter whatsoever including, without limitation, 
the condition of the aircraft, its merchantability or its fitness for 
any particular purpose.28 
The lease had been assigned to an insurance company which has pro-
vided financing for the purchase of the aircraft. This lease, like the 
lease in the Noblett case, also provided that it be interpreted in ac-
cOrdance with Massachusetts law. The plaintiff moved for summary 
judgment on the ground that the disclaimer clause in the lease barred 
the defenses raised by the defendant. In denying the motion, the New 
York Court of Appeals cited G.L., c. 106, §2-302, observing: 
211 Id. at 447. 
26 Id. at 449. 
27 55 Mise. 2d 1066,286 N.Y.s.2d 711 (1967). 
28Id. at 1067, 286 N.Y.s.2d at 71l1. 
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... It is clear that under MassacllUsetts law a claim that a con· . 
tract is unconscionable due to extraordinary limitation of war· 
ranties on the part of one contracting party will preclude the 
granting of summary judgment.29 
A comment aocompanying the abstract of the case in the Uniform 
Commercial Code Report.Digest notes with approval that the court 
expressed no reservations about applying Section 2·302 of the Code to 
a lease transaction. While it is unclear from the' report of the case 
whether the lease was specifically assigned to the financing insurance 
company as security for the financing or for some other purpose,80 it is 
possible that the court in Lear was applying Section 2·302 of the Code 
to a provision in a lease which was a~igned as security. 
Sawyer v. Pioneer Leasing Corp,8! involved the lease of an ice mao 
chine. The lesSee, an independentgfocer, had been given to understand 
that he was purchasing the ice machine. When he asked why he was 
being requested to sign a lease the salesman explained that "it was 
just like buying a car; after you make so many payments, it is your 
box."82 When the machine malfunctioned and the lessee's repeated 
attempts to have the lessor remedy the problem: proved fruitless, the 
lessee stopped making payments and a . lawsuit by the lessqr followed. 
The lower court granted a directed verdict for the lessor Po. the basis 
of a clause in the lease which disclaimed all warranties and declared 
that the machine was delivered' at the "sole risk'; of the lessee. The 
appellate court reversed, holding that the disclaimer clause was invalid 
for failure to comply with Section 2·316(2) of the Code which requires 
that language intended to disclaim implied warranties be "conspic. 
uous": "We are holding that Section [85] 2·S16(2) is applicable to 
leases where the provisions of the lease are analogous to a sale."u In a 
recent New York Case, Hertz Commercial Leasing Corp. v. Transporta-
tion Credit Clearing House,84 a five.year equipment lease was held to 
constitute a transaction governed by Article 2 o~ the Uniform Com· 
mericalCode insofar as its warranties were concethed. The court com· 
mented in this case: 
29 Id. at 1068, 286 N.Y.s.2d at 718. 
80 See 55 Mis.c. 2d at 1067,286 N.Y.S.2d at 712 where the court states: "Chandler 
[Leasing Corporation] obtained finandng of this agreement from an insurance 
colIlpany to which idle lease was assigned aq.d the aircraft mortgaged as 8ecurity." 
It appears unclear from this statement whether. the phraae "as aecurity" applies 
only to the aircraft mortgage or also relates back to the leaae. The construction of 
the sentence tends more to support the interpretation that the lease was intended 
as security. . 
31 244 Ark. 948, 428 S.W,2d 46 (1968). 
82Id. at 946,428 S.W .2dat 48. 
88Id. at 957, 428 S.W.2d at 54. But see, dissent of Justice 'Fogleman, Id. at 958, 
428 S.W.2d at 54, and diSClll8ion in text accompanying note 51 infra (expressing 
reservations concerning the majority's failure to enunciate specific criteria for the 
determination of when a leaae is "analogous to a sale·~. 
84161 N.Y.L.J., No. 85, at 2. Summarized in· 2 CCH Consumer Credit Guide, 
1199,998 (N.Y. Civ. Ct., Spec. T., N.Y. County 1969). 
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In view of the great volume of commercial transactions which 
are entered into by the device of a lease rather than a sale, it 
would be anomalous if this large body of commercial transactions 
were subject to different rules of law than other commercial trans-
actions which tend to the identical economic result.all 
In denying the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment, predicated 
upon a purported disclaimer of warranties in, the lease, the court 
ruled that the alleged diSclaimer did not exclude implied warranties 
of fitness and merchantability since it failed to employ specific language 
to this effect as required by Section 2-316. In holding that Section 
2-316 applied to the lease, the court stated: 
. . . A consideration of the applicable law, and of economic 
reason, leads this court to conclude that Article 2 of the Uniform 
Commercial Code, to the extent that its provisions can be con-
sidered applicable, governs the equipment lease before the Court.a8 
Decisions such as these, particularly decisions which extend the provi-
sions of Article 2 of the Code to lease transactions, invariably evoke 
strenuous objections from the unsuccessful party. In the Noblett case, 
for exampl~, GECC vigorously protested the appellate court's reference 
to Article 2 of the Code in construing the purported "waiver of de-
fenses" claUse in the lease. No doubt equally vigorous objections to 
any application of Article 2 can be expected on remand. 
The arguments in support of such objections generally focus upon 
the fact that leases per se are not expressly governed by the Code. The 
scope of Article 2 is broadly stated in Section 2-102 as encompassing 
"transactions in goods," but this .general assertion is substantially 
restricted by Section 2-106(1) which provides: "In this Article unless 
the context otherwise requires 'contract' and 'agreement' are limited 
to those relating to the present or future sale of goods." Section 2-106(1) 
then proceeds to define a "sale" as consisting of "the passing of title 
from the seller to the buyer for a price." (Emphasis added.) Since no 
passing of title is contemplated in a lease transaction, Article 2 appears, 
at least on its face, to be inapplicable. The scope of Article 9, on the 
other hand, is defined in Section9-102(1)(a) as applying to: 
... any transaction (regardless of its form) which is intended to 
create a security interest in personal property or fixtures including 
goods, documents, instruments, general intangibles, chattel paper, 
accounts or contract rights. [Emphasis added.] 
"Chattel paper" is defined in Section 9-105(1)(b) of the Uniform Com-
mercial Code:" 'Chattel paper' means a writing or writings which 
evidence both a monetary obligation and a security interest in or a 
III Ibid. 
18 Ibid. 
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lease of specific goods." Inasmuch as this definition includes leases 
which evidence a monetary obligation,it is c1earthat it is possible to 
assign a lease as security. The Code makes it clear, however, that this 
must be the specific purpose of the assignment. Code Section 1-201(87) 
provides in pertinent part: 
.•• Unless a lease or consignment is intended as security, res. 
ervation of title thereunder is not a "security interest". . . .: 
Whether a lease is intended as security is to be determined by 
,the facts of each case. . . . 
Thus, unless a given lease is intended to create a security interest, 
it would seem that Article 9 does not apply to the transaction. In 
the Noblett case there is no express recognition, by either the trial 
court or the appellate court, that the lease for the eight pin setting 
machines was assigned to GECC for security. The lease could have 
been assigned outright to GECC on the basis of a sale of chattel pa-
per, a practice not uncommon in commercial circles. In this case, 
Section 9-102(1)(b) would seem to apply. This section provides: 
... [T]his Article applies so far as concerns any personal prop-
erty and fixtures within the jurisdiction of this state. , ... 
(b) to any sale of accounts, contract rights or chat~el paper. 
[Emphasis added.] 
Since, as indicated above, a lease is "chattel paper," this provision 
would appear to place the outright sale of a lease within the ambit 
of Article 9. Yet, unless the lease was intended to create a "security 
interest" such a result would seem to contravene the criterion of 
"intent of the .parties," enunciated in the definition of a "security 
interest" which appears in Section 1-201(87). While on the one hand 
it might be argued that treating the sale of a straight lease as a trans-
action governed by Article 9 flies in the face of this basic definition, 
on the other hand the proponent of such a view must reconcile his 
position with the 1966 amendment of Comment 2 to Section 9-102 
which states: 
Commercial financing on the basis of accounts, contract rights 
and chattel paper is often so conducted that the distinction be-
tween a security transfer and a sale is blurred, and a sale of such 
property is therefore covered. by subsection (I)(b) whether in-
tended for security or not, unless excluded by Section 9-103 or 
Section 9-104. The buyer then is treated as a secured party and 
his interest as a security interest.8T 
In this situation it would appear very difficult to avoid the conclusion 
that the sale of a lease is subject to Article 9. On the other hand, it 
IT See 1 Coogan, Hogan and Vagts, Secured Transactions Under the U.C.C. 
§5.08(2][d] (1967). 
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is possible that the arrangement between Noblett and Bowl-Mor 
was similar to the arrangement regarding the ice machine in the 
Sawyt!1' case. Retention of title to the pin setters by Bowl-Mor could 
have been intended by the parties to be in the nature of a "security 
interest," with a tacit agreement that upon expiration of the lease 
Noblett would either automatically or upon payment of a nominal 
"purchase price" obtain title to the pin setters. In this circumstance 
it is arguable that in accordance with the "lease-sale" analogy ap-
plied in Sawyer and the earlier cases discussed above, the "security 
interest" retained by Bowl-Mor would be in the nature of a "pur-
chase money security interest."88 Code Section 9-206, under which 
GECC sought to validate the alleged waiver of defenses clause pro-
vides in subsection (2): 
When a seller retains a purchase money security interest in 
goods, the Article on Sales (Article 2) governs the sale and any 
disclaimer, limitation or modification of the seller's warranties. 
[Emphasis added.] 
It would seem that extending the "lease-sale" analogy to its logical 
conclusion would justify applying the provisions of Article 2 to 
waiver or I disclaimer clauses in leases "analogous to sales." 
In view of this consideration it is possible that in looking to Sec-
tion 2-210(4) for assistance in interpreting the alleged "waiver of 
defenses" in the lease, the appellate court was not so much applying 
the "sales" provisions of the Code to a secured transaction, as con-
tended by GECC, as it was applying the "sales" provisions of the 
Code to the lease itself, thereby treating the transaction, for all prac-
tical purposes, as a "sale." Assuming this to have been the Court's 
approach, the reference to Section 2-210(4) in determining the in-
tent and effect of the clause in question was entirely logical. While, 
of course, Section 2-210(4) indicates that in assignments for security 
the assignee does not assume the affirmative obligation of the assignor, 
the court, as indicated above, at no point conceded that the assign-
ment to GECC was "for security." Viewed in this light, the Noblett 
decision may implicitly be setting the stage for continuation of the 
current judicial tendency to apply sales provisions and protections 
eto leases "analogous" to sales. 
The developing trend toward extending the coverage of both com-
mon law and Code concepts of unconscionability to lease transactions 
may also have particular significance when Noblett is analyzed in 
terms of present Massachusetts law regarding the validity of waiver 
of defense clauses. In Quality Finance Co. v. Hurley, the Supreme 
Judicial Court considered a conditional sales contract including a 
clause which purported to waive defenses against assignees of the 
contract. Noting a policy in Massachusetts, expressed in the provi-
88 See uce §9-107. 
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sions of General Laws, Chapter 231, Section 5, against the. enfotce-
ment of such "blanket" waivers of defenses. the Court held that such 
a clause.in a sales contract was invalid. The district court in Noblett, 
while pointing out that it did not have access to the Massachusetts 
statutes to verify its opinion, concluded that with the adoption of 
the Uniform Commerical Code and Section 9-206 thereof, General 
Laws, Chapter 231, Section 5 was effectively repealed and that waivers 
of defenses were now expressly apptoved by statute in Massachu .. 
setts.lIlI On this particular point a New York court in GeneItlil Electric 
Credit Corp. v. Beyerlein40 took issue' 'with this' conclusion by the 
districtt court in Noblett. The court in Beyerlein observed: 
, 
. . . I am unable to agree with this conclusion of the District 
Court. Contrary to the information apparently before that court, 
although the Massachusetts U .C.C. did not become effective 
until after the decision of Quality Finance Compara" it' was en-
acted in 1957 prior to the decision and is referred to in a footnote 
appearing at page 154. Although at the time of the enacttnent 
of the Code many existing Massachusetts statutes were repealed, 
an examination of the Annotated Laws of Massachusetts, in-
cluding the 1966 Cumulative Supplement, does not reveal that 
Section 5 of Chapter 21H of the General Law has been tepealed 
or amended. My limited facilities for reSearch of Massachusetts 
law' have failed to disclose any subsequent holding contrary to 
that of Quality Finance Company and I have no reason to as-
sume that the Supreme JudiCial Court of Massachusetts would 
hold differently today.41 
A comment accompanying the abstract of the district co1:ll1 proceed-
ings in the Noblett case in the Uniform Commercial Code Reporter. 
Digest has also criticized the district court's conclusion that waivers. 
of defenses are now expressly approved 'by statute in Massachusett8, 
as being too broad in scope, since the Hurley case involved a COIl-' 
sumer purchasing an autoll'lobile and Section 9-206 does not purport 
to alter existing . non-Code law relating to consumers. 
It would appear that Code Section 9-206 isc:onfined by the scope 
of Article 9 to "secured tr!Ulsactions,", and that the policy in Maua-
chusetts against the enforcement of sum clauses continues except 
where specifically altered by statute. It is noted in this connection 
that, as indicated by the court in Beyerlein, Chapter 281, Section 
5 was not expressly repealed 'when the Code was adopted by the Mas-
sachusetts legislature.d Hence, waiver& of defenses against assignees 
may not be enforceable in Massachusetts wlien' 'Contained in' a noli-
8~Noblett T. General Electric Credit Corp.; 268 F. Supp. at 987 • 
• 055 Misc. 2d 724, 286N.Y.S~2d 351 (1967) • 
• 1Id. at 726·727, 286 N.Y.S.2d at 555. 
d Extensive reaearch of the Mauachuaetta statutes bas failed to reveal any in-
dication that G.L., c. 251, §5. bas been repealed. 
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negotiable chose in action except when: (I) the tran$action involves 
nonconsumer goods; and (2) the assignment with respect to which 
enforcement is sought is intended as an assignment for security." 
Assuming these to be the prerequisites for enforcement of a waiver . 
clause, a purported waiver of defenses under any other circumstances 
could be Unconscionable as a matter of law. Suppose in the Noblett 
case, for example, the waiver of defenses clause had been clearly 
worded and the lease was neither sold nor otherwise intended to 
create a· security iQ,terest. If the court were to treat the original lease 
arrangement as analogous to a sale, the waiver clause in the lease 
could be vulnerable to attack on the grounds that it is prima facie 
~conscionable under present Massachusetts law.44 
In contrast to its negative prohibitions, such as that against ~­
coQ.aonable claU4es or conU'acts, an affirmative requirement of '~good 
faith" obtahu ~ughout the Uniform Commercial Code. Sl!ction 
1-20B of the Code provides that: "Every contract or duty within this 
Act imposes an obligation of good faith in its performance or enforce-
ment." 
Secti~ 9-206(1), under which GECC sought to establish a waiver 
of defcIU,es ,Wl the part of Noblett, provides that such w;pvers shall 
be!. enfotceable by an assignee: "who takes his assignment fo.- value 
in good faith and without notice of a claim or defense .... " (Empha~s 
added.) 
It seems approprilJte at this point to examine the current increase 
in the populari'Y of chattel leases in the light of the good faith prin-
cipleof the Uniform Commercial Code. The theoretical inapplica-
bility of the express warranty, implied warranty, unconscionability 
and other protective provisions of the Code could induce a merchant 
interested in evading these strictures to adopt the use of a lease form 
~ opposed to a sales contract.411 The simple addition of a parol as-
surance that upon the expiration of the lease the lessee would be 
allowed to purchase the chattel for a nominal sum could satisfy the 
lessee's relu~ce to ,enter into such a lease transaction.46 For the 
unscrupulous merchant, a commercial lease, under which the rental 
payments might ultimately exceed by several times the actual value 
of the chattel being leased, could also provide a convenient device 
'411 Including, of course, sales of leases. which are considered as creating a security 
interest, whether or not one was intended. See uee §9-102(1)(b) and text at note 
'7''N/WG. 
44 Unless the court treats the lease as analogous to a sale, there would IeeQl to 
he DO basil upon which the unconscionability provisions of the sales article 91 the 
Code could be invoked. 
411 There i. also a potential tax benefit for the commercial lessee. Under Int. Rev. 
Code of 1954, §162(a)(lJ). sums expended for rentals of equipment in connection 
with a trade Qr bUli~eu are deductible as expenses. On the other hand, if the 
t:quipmcnt is purcbaled. it must be capitalized and only annual depreciation is 
dedw:tible. See Int. llev. Code of 1954, §167(a) • 
•• See I Coogan. Hogan aad VagtI, Secured Transactions Undet The U.C.C. 
§5.0lJ[2][c:} (1967). 
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for circumventing . the uSury laws. Indeed, this potential avenue of 
abuse was perceived in the Pioneer Leasing case. The court com-
mented! 
••• It is possible that similar agreements could be. used to cloak 
us~rious charges. i.e.. a transaction which Was .,,~tua,llY a sale 
could be ~t up as a lease in order to <:nable charges to be made 
that would. under a credit sale. constitute USury.·1 
It might also be noted that GECC as assignee has litigated at least 
two other lawsuits based upon similar leases of bowling pin setting 
machines in the past few years .• & In both cases Bowl-Mor was the 
assignor and the defenses raised included defects in the pin setting 
machines and nonperformance by Bowl-Mor. In both cases GECC 
soughtto preclude these defenses on the basis of the standard waiver 
of defenses clause in the lease. The leases -were both 1 assigned s40rtly 
after their execution and in one case the defendant alleged that G:ECC 
was the alter ego of Bowl-Mor .• 11 It might further be noted that Bowl-
Mor went bankrupt after Noblett's lease was assigned to GECC. In 
the event that Noblett was given assurances regarding training, adver-
tising assistance or future repair service on· the pin· setting machines, 
these tirctimstances might call into question Bowl-Mor's good. faith 
in offering such assurances. 
If Noblett is the implicit harbinger of further expansions in the 
area of applying "sales" concepts to commercial· . leases manifesting . 
the essential tttributes of a sale, questions reguding the ultimate 
limits of this sort of "analogizing" appear certain tOllrise. If the ,full 
warranty protections of Article 2 of the Code are .to be extended to 
leases, it would appear that any clause in a lease purporting to waive 
these protections would have to defer· to the provisions of Section 
2-316 of the Code. This section'requires that the language intended 
to exclude such protections be "conspicuous" and, in the case of an 
implied warranty of fitness, couched in "language which in common 
understandiri'g calls the buyer's attention to the exclusion of war-
ranties and makes plain that there is no implied warranty •..• " Sec-
tion 2-316 further provides that language intended to· exclude or 
modify the implied warranty of merchantability or any part of it 
must specifically mention merchantability. Even if not fully extended 
to cover leases. Section 2-316 should at least su~st minimum stan-
dards of fairness for language intended to modify or exclude common 
·law implied warranties in leasing transactions. 
At least one jurist has recently expressed the fear that further ap-
plication of sales principles to commercial leases will give rise to 
.1 Sawyer v. Pioneer Leasing Corp., 244 Ark. at 958,428 S.W.2d at 54 • 
• & See General Electric Credit Corp. v. Brick Plaza Lane., Inc., Docket No. 
1.25891·64, A·I8908 (N.J. super. Ct., Law Div., Ocean Count)' 1966) (unreported); 
General Electric Credit Corp. v. Beyerlein, 55 Mise. 2d 724,286 N.Y.8.2d 351 (1967) • 
• 11 General Electric Credit Corp. v. Brick Plaza Lanes, Inc., note 48 suprG. 
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serious difficulties. Dissenting in the Sawyer case, Justice Fogleman 
of the Supreme Court of Arkansas opined that in applying the sales 
provisions of the Code to a lease the court was "acting legislatively": 
... I fear the problems that will arise in the future when the 
application of other sections of the Commercial Code to leases 
is sought. The draftsmen of the Code did not have in mind that 
the provisions thereof would be extended to leases, and it may 
well be that the application of other sections will be somewhat 
clumsy. See, e.g., sections 85-2-701 to 85-2-725, both inclusive.GO 
The apprehension expressed by Justice Fogleman is, perhaps, symp-
tomatic of the uncertainty which presently pervades this area of the 
law. The Noblett case is no exception. While the court of appeals 
has ruled that Noblett did not waive his defenses, the ultimate im-
plications of that ruling are far from clear. It remains to be seen 
whether the lower court will follow the recent trend of treating cer-
tain leases as sales and will allow sales defenses such as unconscion-
ability or breach of express or implied warranty to be raised against 
the lease. Even if this approach is adopted by the court, the extent 
to which it might be adopted and its specific ramifications are pres-
ently imponderable. In addition, there remains the question, which 
Noblett cannot at this point resolve, of precisely what effect the adop-
tion of Section 9-206 has had upon the status of clauses purporting 
to waive defenses against assignees in Massachusetts. Is there, as has 
been suggested, a continuing policy in Massachusetts adverse to the 
enforcement of such waivers even in non-consumer situations if the 
transaction is not "secured"? 
The handling of the Noblett case on remand should provide an 
interesting study of the judiciary's struggle to embody in its decisions 
the objectives of flexibility, adaptability and expansion set forth in 
Section 1-102 as the underlying purposes of the Code: 
(1) This Act shall be liberally construed and applied to pro-
mote its underlying purposes and policies. 
(2) Underlying purposes and policies of this Act are: 
(a) to simplify, clarify and modernize the law governing com-
mercial transactions. 
(b) to permit the continued expansion of commercial prac-
tices through custom, usage and agreement of the parties. 
It would seem that these objectives, and indeed the spirit of the Uni-
form Commercial Code itself, more than justify the recent trend to 
accord warranty and other sales protections to lease transactions. 
Noblett should at least be permitted to raise any legitimate defenses 
he might have arising out of his transactions with the now bankrupt 
Bowl-Mor company. Indeed, there seems to be no substantial reason 
GO Sawyer v. Pioneer Leasing Corp., 244 Ark. at 959, 428 S.W.2d at 55. 
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for refusing to accord to a lessee those protections to whitb he would 
have been entitled had he simply signed a different rotm of (Onttlct. 
Such a refusal would elevate form over substatI<:e and would thwart 
a f~mdamental principle, avowedly included in the Code by its 
drafters: . 
This Act is drawn to provide flexibility so that since it is in-
tended to be a semi-permanent piece of legislation, it will provide 
its own machinery for expansion of commercial practices. It is 
intended to make it possible for the law embodied in this Act 
to be developed by the court in the light of unforeseen and new 
circumstances and practices. 111 
The. practicability of this principle of expansion may be tested to 
endurance, however, as interpreters. of the Code struggle, in cases 
such as Noblett, to adapt its proVisions to a burgeoning leasing m-
dustry which deals almost exclusively in transactions .which. the Code 
was not specifically designed to regulate. 
F. ANTHONY MOONEY 
,Ill uee 51-102, Comment 1. 
.,' 
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